par Pelletier, Arnaud 
Editeur scientifique Pelletier, Arnaud;Garau, Rodolfo
Référence Continental Empiricism.Rethinking Experience and Experiments in Early Modern Continental Philosophy and Science, Routledge, New York, page (309-332)
Publication Publié, 2026-05-22
Editeur scientifique Pelletier, Arnaud
;Garau, RodolfoRéférence Continental Empiricism.Rethinking Experience and Experiments in Early Modern Continental Philosophy and Science, Routledge, New York, page (309-332)
Publication Publié, 2026-05-22
Partie d'ouvrage collectif
| Résumé : | In the “New Essays on Human Understanding,” Leibniz ignores Locke’s acknowledgment of the ability to recognize self-evident truths. By so doing, he portrays Locke as claiming that all knowledge derives solely from sensible experience, including a priori propositions in mathematics. Thus, he invents the ‘empiricist position,’ which is understood as a genetic thesis about the origin of knowledge. This chapter explores the alternative (pre-empiricist) conceptions of experience that led Leibniz to invent this position as a faire-valoir. It is important to note that he did not consider sensible experience to be an independent source of knowledge. Rather, he considered it to be a support for all thought. In particular, he considered it necessary for accessing a priori knowledge. Alongside the first principles of reason, he recognized some first principles of experience as the foundation of knowledge. However, he also acknowledges that no proposition—neither mathematical nor metaphysical—is completely pure to our understanding. The distinction between access to knowledge and the source of knowledge, which is often overlooked, is central to this debate. |
