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A blockchain-based information market to incentivise cooperation in swarms of self-interested robots

par Van Calck, Ludéric;Pacheco, Alexandre ;Strobel, Volker ;Dorigo, Marco ;Reina, Andreagiovanni
Référence Scientific Reports, 13, 1
Publication Publié, 2023-09-13

Article révisé par les pairs

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Résumé :

Abstract Robot swarms are generally considered to be composed of cooperative agents that, despite their limited individual capabilities, can perform difficult tasks by working together. However, in open swarms, where different robots can be added to the swarm by different parties with potentially competing interests, cooperation is but one of many strategies. We envision an information market where robots can buy and sell information through transactions stored on a distributed blockchain, and where cooperation is encouraged by the economy itself. As a proof of concept, we study a classical foraging task, where exchanging information with other robots is paramount to accomplish the task efficiently. We illustrate that even a single robot that lies to others—a so-called Byzantine robot—can heavily disrupt the swarm. Hence, we devise two protection mechanisms. Through an individual-level protection mechanism, robots are more sceptical about others’ information and can detect and discard Byzantine information, at the cost of lower efficiency. Through a systemic protection mechanism based on economic rules regulating robot interactions, robots that sell honest information acquire over time more wealth than Byzantines selling false information. Our simulations show that a well-designed robot economy penalises misinformation spreading and protects the swarm from Byzantine behaviour. We believe economics-inspired swarm robotics is a promising research direction that exploits the timely opportunity for decentralised economies offered by blockchain technology.