par Bouckaert, Jan 
;Van Moer, Geert
Référence International journal of industrial organization, 52, page (307-332)
Publication Publié, 2017-05
;Van Moer, GeertRéférence International journal of industrial organization, 52, page (307-332)
Publication Publié, 2017-05
Article révisé par les pairs
| Résumé : | We analyze horizontal subcontracting and show how idle production facilities can reduce contracting costs by credibly protecting against hold-up. Our analysis contributes to understanding competition between power firms that increasingly use intermittent generation sources. Their unilateral incentives to invest in maintaining underused units, such as dispatchable gas-fired plants, are underrated by plant profitability indicators. From a policy perspective, decentralized strategic investment incentives reduce the possible need for centralized security of supply measures. Our welfare analysis indicates that quantity competition can lead to a lower market-clearing price than price competition. |
