Titre:
  • One Person, Many Votes: Divided Majority and Information Aggregation
Auteur:Bouton, Laurent; Castanheira De Moura, Micael
Statut de publication:Publié, 2008-09
series:ECARES Working Papers, 2008-017
Sujet CREF:Economie
Sujet JEL:Noncooperative Games
Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
Asymmetric and Private Information
Volumes/pages:43 p.
Mots-clés:Information Aggregation
Multicandidate Elections
Approval Votting
Poisson Games
Langue:Anglais
Identificateurs:RePEc:eca:wpaper:2013/230579