Thèse de doctorat
Résumé : The EU’s notable transformation over the past five decades is obviously an event of modern state concepts. However, the EU’s matter of concern has placed too much emphasis on economic and trade issues, while its capability and power have achieved remarkable growth with far-reaching ramifications in both economic and political affairs. This also means that studies of the EU foreign policy have hardly reached North East Asia because of geographical limit between them, the EU’s weak institutional capacity and vestige of the Cold War. Therefore the EU and the Korean Peninsula did not have chance to build a critical relationship. This time could be defined as ‘standstill’ between Europe and the Korean Peninsula or ‘quiet diplomacy’. 1993 marked a turning-point in relations between the EU and the Korean Peninsula. Firstly, European countries have launched the Maastricht Treaty since they had signed in 1992. The Treaty implies the EU’s more strengthened international role in the political and economic area in accordance with its increased capability and reinforced power. Secondly, North Korea announced its intention to withdraw from the NPT on 12 March 1993 and then the Korean Peninsula was compelled to face a political crisis. Since the EU took unofficial Humanitarian Aids for North Korea in 1994-1995, KEDO and the EU in 1997 agreed to the terms and conditions of the accession to KEDO of its nuclear regulatory body. This was the first challenge of the EU political engagement of the Korean Peninsula question. In the context, this research seeks to answer the question of “What are the EU priorities in its strategy for Korean Peninsula?” that includes broadly the EU’s regional strategy for North East Asia in line with its foreign policy agenda. To tell the conclusion, the EU’s intervention to North Korea was firstly encouraged in dimension of economic interests through vitalization of international trade after the Korean Peninsula would be reunified. The EU considered that Asian nuclear market is an important factor in order to build nuclear technical standard as well as to obtain commercial interests although the European nuclear firms did not obtain chance enough to construct for North Korea nuclear facilities construction. The EU’s political incentives for political change-seeking in North East Asia must also be considered. Actually, the EU diplomatically opened the door of Pyongyang and led the isolated regime to a channel that communicates with international community although the EU did not take a seat at Six-Party Talks to engage itself in the Korean Peninsula question. As a result, the EU could increase the image of a ‘peaceful mediator’ or an ‘honest blocker’ in the term of ‘reputation’ through engagement continued for the Korean Peninsula Crisis. The EU’s foreign policy has been partly successful in context that Europe succeeds in promoting its existence as a global actor. Therefore, its foreign policy would gradually be reinforced to bolster the EU’s credibility and influence in the Korean Peninsula. The EU’s role is surely reduced in the Korean Peninsula issues with the termination of the KEDO project. However, the EU’s role is expected to be performed in different ways under its confidence and capability. The EU’s next engagement depends on where its new incentives will be, and then its question will be how to realize them in accordance with its institutional conditions and actual capacity.