par Boeri, Tito ;Scarpa, Carlo;Tsyganok, Lidia ;Wey, Christian;Castanheira De Moura, Micael ;Faini, Riccardo;Galasso, Vincenzo;Navaretti, Giorgio Barba;Carcillo, Stéphane;Haskel, Jonathan;Nicoletti, Giuseppe;Perotti, Enrico
Référence Structural Reforms Without Prejudices, Oxford University Press
Publication Publié, 2007-05
Référence Structural Reforms Without Prejudices, Oxford University Press
Publication Publié, 2007-05
Partie d'ouvrage collectif
Résumé : | This chapter concentrates on the reform opportunities that emerge when a government exploits its parliamentary majority. For example the privatizations and pension reforms carried out in the UK by the Thatcher government. When backed by a large parliamentary majority, the policymakers' only constraint is the need to win a future election, which provides freedom of action in most cases. Yet, this strategy is not always valuable. The mix of successes and failures suggests that other institutional elements are crucial, such as the (lack of) internal cohesion in coalition governments or the existence of strong opposition. A strong parliamentary majority can thus be insufficient to generate sufficient coalition building. |