par De Meur, Gisèle 
;Gassner, Marjorie ;Hubaut, Xavier
Référence Advances in psychology, 20, C, page (365-375)
Publication Publié, 1984
;Gassner, Marjorie ;Hubaut, Xavier Référence Advances in psychology, 20, C, page (365-375)
Publication Publié, 1984
Article révisé par les pairs
| Résumé : | The problem considered here is that of electing a delegation when the population of electors is separated into categories, the division being based uoon one or several criteria. A two criteria-based situation currently exists in the Netherlands. Using a slightly more general version of this system, we proved that the only tyne of situation avoiding imDossibi lities is one where each criterion only presents two alternatives. Furthermore, setting a number of conditions, as weak as possible, which must be respected in order to ensure fair representation, the same result remains - which is not so surprising as it could have been suggested by Arrow's famous theorem. © 1984. |
