Titre:
  • Shared Mandates, Moral Hazard and Political (Mis)alignment in a Decentralized Economy
Auteur:Estache, Antonio; Garsous, Grégoire; Seroa da Motta, Ronaldo
Statut de publication:Publié, 2014-11
series:ECARES Working Papers, ECARES 2014-47
Sujet CREF:Economie
Sujet JEL:Publicly Provided Goods: General
National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: Infrastructures; Other Public Investment and Capital Stock
State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations: General
Other Economic Systems: Political Economy; Legal Institutions; Property Rights
Volumes/pages:29 p.
Mots-clés:political alignment
infrastructure provision
moral hazard
regression discontinuity design
Langue:Anglais
Identificateurs:RePEc:eca:wpaper:2013/177104