par Ciriolo, Emanuele
Référence European journal of political economy, 23, 4, page (1007-1024)
Publication Publié, 2007-12
Article révisé par les pairs
Résumé : The introduction of inequity concerns into the Trust Game gives rise to complementary concepts of conditional trustworthiness and unconditional untrustworthiness. When the inequity concern is not accounted for, unconditional untrustworthiness is overestimated. The high proportion of trustees adopting the equal division behavioural norm suggests that an unequal distribution of show-up fees may deter trustors from placing trust, and may eventually reduce the incentive to cooperate for both players. It also follows that increases in income inequality can explain declines in self-reported trust in high-income countries. © 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.