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Vagueness and approximation in relevance theory

par Franken, Nathalie
Référence Journal of pragmatics, 28, 2, page (135-151)
Publication Publié, 1997-08

Article révisé par les pairs

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Résumé :

Relevance theory (Sperber and Wilson, 1986) analyzes vagueness and approximation as instances of loose talk, which involve less than literal interpretations of thoughts. This approach has been developed by Reboul (1989), who tried to account for the interpretive use of concepts. This paper evaluates these proposals and shows that they leave many questions unanswered, especially about the very nature of interpretive use and the identification of speech acts. It is also claimed that vagueness and approximation should be dealt with separately. First, vagueness cannot be reduced to an instance of loose talk. When examining the evidential basis of vague utterances and when analyzing the interpretation processes at work, one realizes that it is necessary to posit the existence of vague concepts. Secondly, in order to account for approximation, one has to rely on assumptions concerning the way people ordinarily speak about certain things. However, it is possible to elaborate, in the framework of relevance theory, an alternative account of vagueness and approximation which proves more satisfying even though it does not succeed in solving all the problems involved.