par Greer, Scott SLG;Martin De Almagro, Maria 
Référence Law & social inquiry, 39, 2, page (361-386)
Publication Publié, 2014
Référence Law & social inquiry, 39, 2, page (361-386)
Publication Publié, 2014
Article révisé par les pairs
| Résumé : | The European Court of Justice, and courts in general, were key actors in thecreation of the European Union (EU). However, they cannot change major policywithout political supporters to lobby and litigate for implementation. We argue that partof the resolution of this apparent paradox comes from complementing existing work on theactivities of EU courts and litigants with a focus on a third actor: implementing bureaucracies,whose effect on law and politics has not been a focus of studies of EU legaldevelopment. Their calculations about whether to pay attention, lobby, and comply shapethe impact of the law. Those calculations are variable and patterned; when and howbureaucracies listen to courts varies in predictable ways. We find evidence for thisproposition in the case of EU health care services law, both in the secondary literature andin empirical studies of France and Spain. |
