par Castanheira De Moura, Micael ;Nicodème, Gaëtan ;Profeta, Paola
Référence International tax and public finance, 19, 4, page (1-27)
Publication Publié, 2012-05-01
Article révisé par les pairs
Résumé : Political constraints and incentives are the true driver of tax reforms. Thispaper reviews the political economics literature on personal income tax systems andreforms to see how political mechanisms help explain tax reforms. We take some ofthe implications of these theories to the data using LABREF, a database that identifieslabor tax reforms in the European Union for the period 2000–2007, and control foreconomic and labor market factors.We find that political variables carry more weightthan economic variables, and we show empirical regularities that support politicaleconomy theories. We also find that governments tended to reform more in bettereconomic times, engaging in pro-cyclical behavior