par Asker, John;Cantillon, Estelle 
Référence The Rand journal of economics, 41, 1, page (1-34)
Publication Publié, 2010
Référence The Rand journal of economics, 41, 1, page (1-34)
Publication Publié, 2010
Article révisé par les pairs
| Résumé : | A buyer seeks to procure a good characterized by its price and its quality from suppliers who have private information about their cost structure ( xed cost and marginal cost of providing quality). We characterize the buyers optimal buying mechanism. We then use the optimal mechanism as a theoretical and numerical benchmark to study simpler buying procedures such as scoring auctions and bargaining. Scoring auctions can extract a signifi cant proportion of the buyers strategic surplus (the difference between the expected utility from the optimal mechanism and the e¢ cient auction). Bargaining does less well and often does worse than the e¢ cient auction. |
