par Bazan, Ariane 
Editeur scientifique Dietrich, D.;Fodor, G.;Zucker, G.;Bruckner, David
Référence Simulating the Mind. The Mental Apparatus, A Technical Neuropsychoanalytical Approach, Springer, Wien, page (394-399)
Publication Publié, 2008
Editeur scientifique Dietrich, D.;Fodor, G.;Zucker, G.;Bruckner, David
Référence Simulating the Mind. The Mental Apparatus, A Technical Neuropsychoanalytical Approach, Springer, Wien, page (394-399)
Publication Publié, 2008
Partie d'ouvrage collectif
| Résumé : | During the ENF conference day on July 23rd 2007, both Peter Palensky and Gerhard Zucker (né Pratl) presented schematic simulation modules of the mind in which one detail struck me. While the brain was conceived as embedded in a body and likewise, this body was conceived as present in a context or an environment, the mind-module was built so as to make, at the level of the perception entry point, an a priori distinction between external and internal signals, i.e. between signals coming from the environment or from the body respectively. In Pratl’s model (flashed for only one second), these entry points were even anatomically distinct. |
