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Conditionality, Separation, and Open Rules in Multilateral Institutions

par Conconi, Paola ;Perroni, Carlo
Editeur scientifique Hartigan, James C.
Référence Handbook of International Trade, Economic and Legal Analysis of Laws and Institutions, Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, U.K. and Cambridge, MA
Publication Publié, 2005

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Résumé :

We examine the implications for the viability of multilateral cooperation of different legal principles governing how separate international agreements relate to each other. We contrast three alternative rules: conditionality - making cooperation in one area a condition for cooperation in another; separation - forbidding sanctions in one area to be used to enforce cooperation in others; and open rules, i.e., the absence of any restriction on the patterns of cross-issue cooperation arrangements and sanctions. As an example, we focus on trade and environmental agreements. Our analysis suggests that conditionality is more likely to facilitate multilateral, multi-issue cooperation in situations where the environmental policy stakes are small relative to the welfare effects of trade policies; when the costs of environmental compliance are high, a conditionality rule can hinder multilateral cooperation. Separation can undermine cooperation by limiting punishment, but can also promote broad cooperation by making partial cooperation more difficult to sustain.