Résumé : Drawing on unexploited inventory ledgers of the Antwerp dealer-auctioneer Campo (4,109 artworks, 1937–1954) and competing-risks survival analysis, this article examines how a hybrid intermediary allocated stock across direct sales, in-house auctions and third- party auctions. By analogy with pecking order theory, we identify a hierarchy of sales channels. Higher-priced works and works by artists Campo handled frequently were likely to be sold directly. Lower-end artworks more often left through third-party auctions after long holding periods. Campo’s own auctions served as a fast-turnover intermediate channel. The war also shifted channel use: wartime acquisitions were more often sold directly, pre-war ones at Campo’s own auctions and post-war ones through third parties. By documenting channel segmentation and adaptive sales strategies, the article contributes to business history on market intermediation in times of crisis, to art market studies, and to provenance research in the Belgian National Socialist context.