par Jaquet, François 
Référence Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, 24, 1, page (102-118)
Publication Publié, 2023-02-01

Référence Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, 24, 1, page (102-118)
Publication Publié, 2023-02-01
Article révisé par les pairs
| Résumé : | According to the moral error theory, all moral judgments are false. Until lately, most error theorists were local error theorists; they targeted moral judgments specifically and were less skeptical of other normative areas. These error theorists now face so-called “prudential parity objections,” according to which whatever evidence there is in favor of the moral error theory is also evidence for a prudential error theory. The present paper rejects three prudential parity objections: one based on the alleged irreducible normativity of prudential reasons; another on the lack of a story about the normativity of hypothetical reasons; yet another on the very nature of reasons generally. I argue that these objections leave an important variant of a local moral error theory intact. |



