par Tchakoute Tchuigoua, Hubert
Référence International journal of finance and economics, 31, 2, page (2431-2454)
Publication Publié, 2026-09-01
Article révisé par les pairs
Résumé : Drawing on the information asymmetry perspective, this study examines whether lenders and donors reward the transparencyof financial organisations with a social mission such as microfinance institutions (MFIs). Using panel data econometrics on anunbalanced sample of 6338 MFI year observations for 1322 MFIs from 83 countries, our analysis reveals a positive correlationbetween transparency ratings, subsidies, and private debt. Greater transparency is associated with both market and non-marketfinancing, as MFIs with higher levels of transparency attract more capital from lenders at below-market rates. Greater transpar-ency helps MFIs attract capital at lower costs, especially in regulated environments and mature microfinance markets. Moreover,MFIs with high levels of transparency tend to have lower leverage in contexts where loan contracts are well enforced. This sug-gests that the relationship between transparency and leverage is context-dependent.