par Debande, Julien 
Référence 2nd EmergEU Workshop: The EU’s response to internal crises and emergencies: transforming competences, institutional balance, and policy directions? (2026-03-30: Maastricht)
Publication Non publié, 2026-03-30
Référence 2nd EmergEU Workshop: The EU’s response to internal crises and emergencies: transforming competences, institutional balance, and policy directions? (2026-03-30: Maastricht)
Publication Non publié, 2026-03-30
Communication à un colloque
| Résumé : | The EU treaties have long foreseen the possibility of providing financial assistance to Member States in case of severe difficulties. The option to activate Article 122 TFEU to respond to exogenous shocks, such as the Covid-19 pandemic , has been mobilised whenever needed, for instance, with the creation of the SURE instrument . Having tested the limits of such a temporary instrument and highlighted the narrow flexibility of the Union’s budgetary framework, the European Commission presented its proposal for a Council Decision on the System of EU Own Resources for the Multiannual Financial Framework 2028-2034. While the current architecture remains largely dependent on national contributions, the proposal introduces significant innovations, particularly by embedding a permanent borrowing capacity for crisis directly into the Union’s budgetary framework, subsequently enabling the Union to provide substantial financial assistance to Member States. This unique crisis-response loan mechanism would be contingent on clearly defined material and procedural requirements. It could only be activated in the context of a severe crisis or hardship, or a serious threat affecting the Union or its Member States. Borrowing under this mechanism would be limited to addressing the consequences of the crisis, with no adequate alternative solutions available under other existing Union programmes. Procedurally, activation would also require the adoption of a Council Regulation with the consent of the European Parliament. Finally, the possibility to increase the own-resources ceiling would be limited to a 0.25-percentage-point increase, and could exclusively cover potential liabilities arising from the loans. Taken together, this arrangement would represent a significant lending capacity throughout the 2028–2034 MFF.However, questions arise regarding access and governance . The proposed paper aims to measure the shift this proposal would introduce in the way the EU responds to internal crises and emergencies, and to what extent it further deepens the institutionalisation of crisis intervention, with strong consequences for the role of the Commission in the Union’s governance . The proposed paper will undertake a longitudinal analysis of the Union’s crisis-response loan instruments, aiming to assess how the new proposal preserves certain features while diverging in institutional embedding. While the Union borrows from financial markets and provides back-to-back loans to Member States in times of crisis, this proposed mechanism would be fully integrated into the budgetary and own-resources framework. This is unlike SURE, which relied on an ad hoc system. The proposed analysis will argue that such a transition from an intergovernmental, emergency-driven logic to a budget-anchored instrument signals a major constitutional development. It suggests a gradual alignment of the Commission’s crisis-management role with other instruments, such as the European Stability Mechanism during the sovereign debt crisis, and a deeper transformation of EU budgetary governance. This shift illustrates the Commission’s attempt to institutionalise crisis intervention beyond the euro area and within Union law. To grasp the constitutional change potentially introduced, the paper will show how the proposal, if adopted, would recalibrate the division of competences and power, expand the Commission’s stabilisation capacity and blur the line between EU budgetary authority and Member State sovereignty. |
