par Moncoucy, Léa 
;Dołȩga, Krzysztof;Tallon-Baudry, Catherine;Cleeremans, Axel
Référence Philosophical transactions - Royal Society. Biological Sciences, 380, 1939, 20240303
Publication Publié, 2025-11-01
;Dołȩga, Krzysztof;Tallon-Baudry, Catherine;Cleeremans, Axel Référence Philosophical transactions - Royal Society. Biological Sciences, 380, 1939, 20240303
Publication Publié, 2025-11-01
Article révisé par les pairs
| Résumé : | DC. Dennett (2020,personal communication) asked: 'How do we go from doing things for reasons to having reasons for doing things?'. This question targets a fundamental shift in nature: while all organisms act in the way they do for reasons that are shaped by extrinsic evolutionary cost functions, some also act for reasons of their own, even engaging in behaviour that may be detrimental to their own existence. For such organisms, we argue, phenomenal experience - what it feels like - has intrinsic value. Here, we elaborate on the perspective developed by Axel Cleeremans and Catherine Tallon-Baudry (Cleeremans, Tallon-Baudry 2022 Neurosci. Conscious, 2022, niac007. (doi:10.1093/nc/niac007)) and defend the claim that phenomenal experience broadens an organism's ability to act in a manner that is not merely responsive to the objective value of an extrinsic evolutionary cost function but is also shaped by the preference-driven subjective value associated with items, situations, events or other agents. Importantly, we argue that the intrinsic value of subjective experience cannot always be reduced to other forms of extrinsic values, because subjective value can act not only as a driver of behaviour, but also as a target for behaviour. This article is part of the theme issue 'Evolutionary functions of consciousness'. |
