par Montero Porras, Eladio 
;Suchon, Remi ;Lenaerts, Tom ;Fernandez Domingos, Elias
Référence PloS one, 20, 9, page (e0331348)
Publication Publié, 2025-09-01
;Suchon, Remi ;Lenaerts, Tom ;Fernandez Domingos, Elias Référence PloS one, 20, 9, page (e0331348)
Publication Publié, 2025-09-01
Article révisé par les pairs
| Résumé : | Managing shared resources requires balancing personal profit and sustainability. This paper reports on a behavioural experiment testing how extraction defaults—either pro-social or exploitative—impact resource extraction in a common pool resource dilemma (CPRD). We find that an exploitative default increases average extraction compared to a control without a default, while a pro-social default temporarily reduces extraction. The effects of both defaults are temporary, and extraction levels converge to those in the control group, with the pro-social default fading faster. Notably, the influence of defaults depended on individual inclinations, with cooperative individuals extracting more under an exploitative default, and selfish individuals less under a pro-social default. Our findings suggest that while defaults can promote short-term sustainability, their long-term effects are limited, and their effectiveness depends on individual traits. |
