par Deleixhe, Martin 
Référence European political science, 24, 3, page (438-452)
Publication Publié, 2025-09-01
Référence European political science, 24, 3, page (438-452)
Publication Publié, 2025-09-01
Article révisé par les pairs
| Résumé : | This article discusses critically the consensus-based account of peoplehood, inherited from Hobbes and Rousseau, whose central tenet is that scattered individuals coalesce into a people when subjected to a single will. It claims that, because this account of peoplehood is indexed on unity, it is difficult to reconcile with a democratic perspective. The article contends that Rancière’s dissensus-based account of peoplehood—according to which the people is constituted through the staging of its internal division—is more in line with democratic expectations. To further buttress this claim, it addresses a recurrent critique: since dissensus is episodic, it would prove unable to provide a people with a sustained democratic agency. It turns to Lea Ypi and Jonathan White’s discussion of partisanship practices and presents them as a possible institutionalization of dissensus. The article’s second section showcases the relevance of the dissensus-based account of peoplehood by applying it to the claim that the lack of support for the European Union is due to the absence of a European people. It argues that the dissensus-based account of peoplehood breaks the current conceptual deadlock regarding whether (or not) the European Union can rely on a European people by shifting the critical focus on the lack of venues and mechanisms to express dissent within the EU. |
