Titre:
  • Hold-up in Syndicated Lending: Why Do Bank Relationships Lead to Higher Costs for High-Quality Firms?
Auteur:Burietz, Aurore; Oosterlinck, Kim; Szafarz, Ariane
Statut de publication:Publié, 2025-06-27
series:Working Papers CEB, 25-005
Sujet CREF:Economie
Sujet JEL:Asymmetric and Private Information
Determination of Interest Rates; Term Structure of Interest Rates
Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage; Rating Agencies
Mots-clés:Lending relationship
Hold-up effect
Syndicated loans
Lender’s reputation
Credit risk
Langue:Anglais
Identificateurs:RePEc:sol:wpaper:2013/391874