par Scopelliti, Gianluca;Baumann, Christoph;Mühlberg, Jan Tobias 
Référence (08-12 July 2024: Vienna, Austria), 2024 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy Workshops (EuroS&PW), IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy Workshops, page (169 - 176)
Publication Publié, 2024-02-01
Référence (08-12 July 2024: Vienna, Austria), 2024 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy Workshops (EuroS&PW), IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy Workshops, page (169 - 176)
Publication Publié, 2024-02-01
Publication dans des actes
| Résumé : | A major drawback of cloud computing used to be the lack of confidentiality and verifiability of computations, making it impossible to use public commercial clouds to work with sensitive code or data. With the availability of Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) came the promise of enabling confidential computations in the cloud. A number of big Cloud Service Providers (CSP) now supports the deployment of Confidential Virtual Machines (CVMs) that can be attested remotely, supposedly guaranteeing verifiable isolation and integrity, and removing potentially compromised or malicious infrastructure from the system's Trusted Computing Base (TCB). In this paper, we investigate this claim and examine the CVM infrastructure provided by commercial CSPs regarding the attestability of the TEE hardware and the entire CVM software stack, and transparency regarding software provisioned by the CSP. We develop a hierarchy of attestation levels to explain our findings and trust limitations. For the services analysed, we observe that many attestation steps can only partially be verified by the CVM owner. Thus, running CVMs on these CSPs' infrastructures does not allow full TCB reduction through independently verifiable attestation but requires trust in the CSP to deploy secure software and to truthfully report attestation data. Complete protection from infrastructural threats is thus not provided. |
