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7. Searching for Strategic Arms Control Obligations amidst the Suspension of the New START Treaty

par Aman Eddine, Razy
Editeur scientifique Wan, Wilfred W.W.;Chernavskikh, Vladislav V.C.
Référence 7. Searching for Strategic Arms Control Obligations amidst the Suspension of the New START Treaty, Uppsala University, Uppsala, Vol. Expanding Perspectives on Nuclear Disarmament, Expanding Perspectives on Nuclear Disarmament, page (57-73)
Publication Publié, 2023-12-20

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Résumé :

For over 50 years, US-Russia strategic armaments have been controlled by bilateral treaties, with New START being the latest example. However, amidst escalating tensions, the last remaining nuclear arms control treaty between the world’s two largest strategic arsenals was suspended in February 2023. Both states declared their continued adherence to the treaty’s warheads numerical limits, notwithstanding their rejection of on-site inspection activities. This study analyses how passive and active obligations of arms control are perceived. It scrutinises the contemporary status of quantitative limits either as a political declaration or continued binding obligation. It then explores the concerns behind the rejection of on-site inspections amid ongoing current strains of war, considering whether they could represent a broader shift in stance instead. Finally, it attempts to offer some ‘surprise-free projections’ on the future of US-Russia arms control obligations. Overall, the paper aims to expand understanding of the complex nature of arms control treaty-based commitments.