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Committing to the wrong artificial delegate in a collective-risk dilemma is better than directly committing mistakes

par Terrucha, Ines;Fernández Domingos, Elias;Simoens, Pieter;Lenaerts, Tom
Référence Scientific reports, 14, 1, 10460
Publication Publié, 2024-12

Article révisé par les pairs

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Résumé :

While autonomous artificial agents are assumed to perfectly execute the strategies they are programmed with, humans who design them may make mistakes. These mistakes may lead to a misalignment between the humans’ intended goals and their agents’ observed behavior, a problem of value alignment. Such an alignment problem may have particularly strong consequences when these autonomous systems are used in social contexts that involve some form of collective risk. By means of an evolutionary game theoretical model, we investigate whether errors in the configuration of artificial agents change the outcome of a collective-risk dilemma, in comparison to a scenario with no delegation. Delegation is here distinguished from no-delegation simply by the moment at which a mistake occurs: either when programming/choosing the agent (in case of delegation) or when executing the actions at each round of the game (in case of no-delegation). We find that, while errors decrease success rate, it is better to delegate and commit to a somewhat flawed strategy, perfectly executed by an autonomous agent, than to commit execution errors directly. Our model also shows that in the long-term, delegation strategies should be favored over no-delegation, if given the choice.