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Voluntary versus mandatory information disclosure in the sequential prisoner’s dilemma

par Kirchsteiger, Georg ;Lenaerts, Tom ;Suchon, Remi
Référence Economic theory
Publication Publié, 2024-06-01

Article révisé par les pairs

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Résumé :

In sequential social dilemmas with stranger matching, initiating cooperation is inherently risky for the first mover. The disclosure of the second mover’s past actions may be necessary to instigate cooperation. We experimentally compare the effect of mandatory and voluntary disclosure with non-disclosure in a sequential prisoner’s dilemma situation. Our results confirm the positive effects of disclosure on cooperation. We also find that voluntary disclosure is as effective as mandatory disclosure, which runs counter to the results of existing literature on this topic. With voluntary disclosure, second movers who have a good track record chose to disclose, suggesting that they anticipate non-disclosure would signal non-cooperativeness. First movers interpret non-disclosure correctly as a signal of non-cooperativeness. Therefore, they cooperate less than half as often when the second mover decides not to disclose.