par Brice, Léonard
;Raskin, Jean-François
;Van Den Bogaard, Marie 
Référence Leibniz international proceedings in informatics, 272, 26
Publication Publié, 2023-08-01



Référence Leibniz international proceedings in informatics, 272, 26
Publication Publié, 2023-08-01
Article révisé par les pairs
Résumé : | We study a natural problem about rational behaviors in multiplayer non-zero-sum sequential infinite duration games played on graphs: rational verification, that consists in deciding whether all the rational answers to a given strategy satisfy some specification. We give the complexities of that problem for two major concepts of rationality: Nash equilibria and subgame-perfect equilibria, and for three major classes of payoff functions: energy, discounted-sum, and mean-payoff. |