par Vittori, Davide 
;Paulis, Emilien ;Pilet, Jean-Benoît ;Rojon, Sébastien
Référence Electoral studies, 81, page (102566)
Publication Publié, 2023
;Paulis, Emilien ;Pilet, Jean-Benoît ;Rojon, Sébastien Référence Electoral studies, 81, page (102566)
Publication Publié, 2023
Article révisé par les pairs
| Résumé : | Are policies proposed by technocrats more easily accepted by citizens than those proposed by traditional partisan actors? This is a crucial question, as politicians increasingly rely on technocrats for resolving “wicked problems” such as financial, environmental, and health crises. To answer this question, we conducted a survey experiment among 5000 Italian respondents. At the time of our experiment, Italy was governed by a “grand coalition” of various technocratic and partisan actors, enabling us to realistically vary the proponents of different policy proposals. Overall, citizens are more likely to accept policies proposed by technocrats as opposed to party leaders. In particular, we find that technocratic proponents boost policy acceptance even more for economic and valence issues. Furthermore, we find that this “technocratic effect” is generally stronger among citizens who are more likely to disagree with the policy content. |
