par Ceylan, Seyit Ali 
Référence Revue philosophique de Louvain, 117, 1, page (63-82)
Publication Publié, 2019
Référence Revue philosophique de Louvain, 117, 1, page (63-82)
Publication Publié, 2019
Article révisé par les pairs
| Résumé : | Taken literally, Spinoza's thought does not appear to attach great value to the existence of animals. However, if Spinozism is a philosophy in which the geometrical observation of modes is important, animal existence must be able to play a specific role in it. Without entering into the topic already investigated of the difference between animals and human beings, which for Spinoza would authorise us to use them « as we please », we attempt to develop three aspects of animal existence that could be of importance to us in other respects. Thus animals are considered for human beings to be in turn (1) an object of theoretical observation that permits us to struggle against belief in certain metaphysical concepts, such as free will, but also (2) an affect of this same observation and, more broadly and in keeping with this second aspect, (3) an affect turned towards life contrary to the affects proceeding from satirical judgements. |
