par Brihaye, Thomas;Bruyère, Véronique;Goeminne, Aline 
;Thomasset, Nathan
Référence Lecture notes in computer science, 11674 LNCS, page (48-62)
Publication Publié, 2019
;Thomasset, NathanRéférence Lecture notes in computer science, 11674 LNCS, page (48-62)
Publication Publié, 2019
Article révisé par les pairs
| Résumé : | We study multiplayer reachability games played on a finite directed graph equipped with target sets, one for each player. In those reachability games, it is known that there always exists a Nash equilibrium (NE) and a subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE). But sometimes several equilibria may coexist such that in one equilibrium no player reaches his target set whereas in another one several players reach it. It is thus very natural to identify “relevant” equilibria. In this paper, we consider different notions of relevant equilibria including Pareto optimal equilibria and equilibria with high social welfare. We provide complexity results for various related decision problems. |
