par Peters, Marc 
;Huhtaniemi, Hannes
Référence The journal of financial market infrastructures, 6, 1, page (79-106)
Publication Publié, 2017-10-02
;Huhtaniemi, HannesRéférence The journal of financial market infrastructures, 6, 1, page (79-106)
Publication Publié, 2017-10-02
Article révisé par les pairs
| Résumé : | This paper contributes to the literature on the recovery and resolution of central counterparties (CCPs) by exploring the key components of the recent European legislative proposal on the recovery and resolution of CCPs, the main differences with the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive as well as its main underlying policy options. To our knowledge, it is one of the first studies providing a detailed analysis of the proposed European framework. Following the G20 commitments to reform over-the-counter derivatives markets, jurisdictions started requiring standardized transactions in these instruments to be cleared in CCPs, thereby making them even more systemic. In Europe, this commitment has been transposed in the European Market Infrastructure Regulation. The proposal constitutes the completion of this framework, ensuring that crises in CCPs can be addressed in an orderly manner. It is aligned with related international work. It balances predictability for CCPs and their participants and flexibility for resolution authorities to use their powers when there is still certainty about the available financial resources. One of the key challenges ahead for authorities will notably be to operationalize and articulate the possible simultaneous resolution of Global Systemically Important Banks (G-SIBs) and of CCPs, and to make resolution decisions effective on a cross-border basis. |
