par Basteck, Christian 
;Mantovani, Marco
Référence Games and economic behavior, 109, page (156-183)
Publication Publié, 2018-05-01
;Mantovani, MarcoRéférence Games and economic behavior, 109, page (156-183)
Publication Publié, 2018-05-01
Article révisé par les pairs
| Résumé : | We take school admission mechanisms to the lab to test whether the widely-used manipulable Immediate Acceptance mechanism disadvantages students of lower cognitive ability and whether this leads to ability segregation across schools. Results show this to be the case: lower ability participants receive lower payoffs and are over-represented at the worst school. Under the strategy-proof Deferred Acceptance mechanism, payoff differences are reduced, and ability distributions across schools harmonized. Hence, we find support for the argument that a strategy-proof mechanism “levels the playing field”. Finally, we document a trade-off between equity and efficiency in that average payoffs are larger under Immediate than under Deferred Acceptance. |
