par Anderson, Simon P.;Neven, Damien 
Référence Journal of regional science, 30, 1, page (1-14)
Publication Publié, 1990
Référence Journal of regional science, 30, 1, page (1-14)
Publication Publié, 1990
Article révisé par les pairs
| Résumé : | In this paper, we consider oligopolistic competition in a spatial model when firms take care of goods' delivery and discriminate among consumers. Firms compete by setting quantity schedules independently over space. We show that under general conditions a Nash equilibrium in this game exists and is unique. In equilibrium, firms’ markets overlap, a feature which accords with intuition and empirical observations. Over the interval between two firms, the equilibrium spatial price schedule is quasi‐concave (quasi‐convex) when transport costs are concave (convex). With linear transport costs, the model predicts uniform delivered pricing. Uniform pricing could moreover be obtained by a combination of increasing returns to volume in transportation together with concavity of unit transport costs in distance. Copyright © 1990, Wiley Blackwell. All rights reserved |
