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On the existence of weak subgame perfect equilibria

par Bruyère, Véronique;Le Roux, Stephane ;Pauly, Arno ;Raskin, Jean-François
Référence Lecture notes in computer science, 10203 LNCS, page (145-161)
Publication Publié, 2017

Article révisé par les pairs

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Résumé :

We study multi-player turn-based games played on a directed graph, where the number of players and vertices can be infinite. An outcome is assigned to every play of the game. Each player has a preference relation on the set of outcomes which allows him to compare plays. We focus on the recently introduced notion of weak subgame perfect equilibrium (weak SPE), a variant of the classical notion of SPE, where players who deviate can only use strategies deviating from their initial strategy in a finite number of histories. We give general conditions on the structure of the game graph and the preference relations of the players that guarantee the existence of a weak SPE, which moreover is finite-memory.