par Richard, Sébastien 
Référence The Great Phenomenological Schism : Reactions to Husserl Transcendental Idealism (3-6 juin 2015: Université nationale autonome du Mexique, Mexico City)
Publication Non publié, 2015-05-03
Référence The Great Phenomenological Schism : Reactions to Husserl Transcendental Idealism (3-6 juin 2015: Université nationale autonome du Mexique, Mexico City)
Publication Non publié, 2015-05-03
Communication à un colloque
| Résumé : | Roman Ingarden never accepted what he considered to be Husserl’s move from metaphysical realism to idealism. The debate on idealism between Husserl and Ingarden rests mainly on a different conception of the priority between ontology and phenomenology. After a brief presentation of the Ingardenian conception of the relations between the different philosophical disciplines, we show how Ingarden, in order to identify clearly Husserl’s so-called metaphysical idealism, re-interpreted in an ontological way some central phenomenological concepts:1) The “constitution” which is interpreted as a creative or productive activity able to form intentional objects at will. 2) The “constituted object” which is seen as a purely intentional object with a mode of being separate from real and ideal modes of being. The result of this Ingardenian ontological analysis is that Husserl’s idealism is not a kind of Berkeleyan idealism, but rather an idealist dependence creationism in which the real world is a created purely intentional object, that is a heteronomous, derivative, selfsufficient and dependent object with respect to pure consciousness. In the final part of our talk, we show that in his analysis Ingarden did not misunderstand some of the central concepts of phenomenology, such as the constitution, the noema or the reduction, but rather challenged the philosophical range of the Husserlian phenomenology. |
