par Conconi, Paola 
;De Remer, David ;Kirchsteiger, Georg ;Trimarchi, Lorenzo ;Zanardi, Maurizio
Référence Journal of international economics
Publication Publié, 2017
;De Remer, David ;Kirchsteiger, Georg ;Trimarchi, Lorenzo ;Zanardi, Maurizio Référence Journal of international economics
Publication Publié, 2017
Article révisé par les pairs
| Résumé : | This paper shows that electoral incentives crucially affect the initiation of trade disputes. Focusing on WTO disputes filed by the United States during the 1995–2014 period, we find that U.S. presidents are more likely to initiate a dispute in the year preceding their re-election. Moreover, U.S. trade disputes are more likely to involve industries that are important in swing states. To explain these regularities, we develop a theoreticalmodel in which re-election motives can lead an incumbent politician to file trade disputes to appeal to voters motivated by reciprocity. |
