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Continued Dialogue on The Oxford-style Debate from the 15th Annual Congress of the International Neuropsychoanalysis Society, New York City, 2014: Speaking to the subject or speaking to the function: each address requires its proper terms

par Mosri, Daniela-Flores M.D-F;Axmacher, Nikolai A.N;Bazan, Ariane ;Kessler, Ronald C. K.R-C
Référence Neuro-psychoanalysis, 18, page (69-77)
Publication Publié, 2016

Article révisé par les pairs

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Résumé :

In neuropsychoanalysis, the epistemological line most held is the “dual aspect monism” perspective. This perspective holds that “our brains, including mind, are made of one kind of stuff, cells, but we perceive this stuff in two different ways” (Solms & Turnbull, 2003, pp. 56–58; our italics). One is the neuroscientists’ “objective” way, or the brain, which we dissect “with scalpel and microscope or look at it with brain scans and then trace neurochemical pathways.” The other way is the psychoanalysts’ “subjective” way, or the mind: “how we feel and what we think. Freud refined this kind of observation into free association.” As, however, there is only one object, in the end, there is a more or less direct correspondence between phenomena of the brain and phenomena of the mind.