par Bouzahzah, Mohamed;Docquier, Frédéric 
;Tarbalouti, Essaïd
Référence Revue d'économie du développement, 101, 4, page (47-64)
Publication Publié, 2001
;Tarbalouti, EssaïdRéférence Revue d'économie du développement, 101, 4, page (47-64)
Publication Publié, 2001
Article révisé par les pairs
| Résumé : | The empirical literature on inequality and economic growth in LDC's reveals that the political demand for redistribution is not increasing with inequality. These stylized facts are at odds with the main stream of the theoretical literature on the political economy of redistribution and growth. Several arguments can be used to explain this puzzle. In this paper, we introduce strategic vote-rigging under the form of vote purchases. We derive the theoretical conditions under which such practices decrease the official redistributive transfers from the rich to the poor. Then, the consequences in terms of growth and development as well as the policy implications are discussed. |
