par Khalil, Fahad;Lawarree, Jacques
Référence Journal of public economics, 82, 3, page (327-347)
Publication Publié, 2001-12
Article révisé par les pairs
Résumé : In a principal-agent model with multiple performance measures, we show that the principal benefits by choosing ex post which variables will be monitored. If it is too costly for one type of agent to mimic all performance measures expected from another type, the principal can hope to catch the agent on the wrong foot if the agent tries to misrepresent his type. For cases of small asymmetry of information, the principal can implement the first best contract. For more serious asymmetries of information, the first best is not implementable. Then the low type may be required to overproduce, which is in contrast to the traditional result of second best contracting. We also obtain a ranking of monitoring instruments according to the frequency of their use. © Elsevier Science B.V.