par Woodhead, Erik 
Président du jury Cerf, Nicolas
Promoteur Massar, Serge;Pironio, Stefano
Publication Non publié, 2014-12-10
Président du jury Cerf, Nicolas
Promoteur Massar, Serge
;Pironio, Stefano Publication Non publié, 2014-12-10
Thèse de doctorat
| Résumé : | Quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols are intended to allow cryptographic keys to be generated and distributed in way that is provably secure based on inherent limitations, such as the no-cloning principle, imposed by quantum mechanics. This unique advantage compared with classical cryptography comes with an added difficulty: key bits in QKD protocols are encoded in analogue quantum states and their preparation is consequently subject to the usual imprecisions inevitable in any real world experiment. The negative impact of such imprecisions is illustrated for the BB84 QKD protocol. Following this, the main part of this thesis is concerned with the incorporation of such imprecisions in security proofs of the BB84 and two semi-device-independent protocols against the class of collective attacks. On a technical level, by contrast with the vast majority of security proofs developed since the turn of the century, in which recasting the protocol into an equivalent entanglement-based form features heavily in the analysis, the main results obtained here are approached directly from the prepare-and-measure perspective and in particular the connection with the no-cloning theorem and an early security proof by Fuchs et al. against the class of individual attacks is emphasised. This thesis also summarises, as an appendix, a separate project which introduces and defines a hierarchy of polytopes intermediate between the local and no-signalling polytopes from the field of Bell nonlocality. |
