par Barrett, Jonathan 
;Hardy, Lucien;Kent, Adrian
Référence Physical review letters, 95, 1, 010503
Publication Publié, 2005-07
;Hardy, Lucien;Kent, AdrianRéférence Physical review letters, 95, 1, 010503
Publication Publié, 2005-07
Article révisé par les pairs
| Résumé : | Standard quantum key distribution protocols are provably secure against eavesdropping attacks, if quantum theory is correct. It is theoretically interesting to know if we need to assume the validity of quantum theory to prove the security of quantum key distribution, or whether its security can be based on other physical principles. The question would also be of practical interest if quantum mechanics were ever to fail in some regime, because a scientifically and technologically advanced eavesdropper could perhaps use postquantum physics to extract information from quantum communications without necessarily causing the quantum state disturbances on which existing security proofs rely. Here we describe a key distribution scheme provably secure against general attacks by a postquantum eavesdropper limited only by the impossibility of superluminal signaling. Its security stems from violation of a Bell inequality. © 2005 The American Physical Society. |
