par Pisani-Ferry, Jean;Sapir, André 
;Tille, Cedric
Référence Economic Policy 62, John Wiley and Sons, page (341-373)
Publication Publié, 2012-09
;Tille, CedricRéférence Economic Policy 62, John Wiley and Sons, page (341-373)
Publication Publié, 2012-09
Partie d'ouvrage collectif
| Résumé : | For well over a decade many observers had warned that the European Unionwas ill-prepared in case of a financial storm because its market integration faroutpaced its policy integration. This situation was well known to policy-makersbut it was hoped that financial crises would wait until policy integrationoccurred. The reality turned out differently, however. We assess the managementof the 2007-2009 banking crisis within the EU against this backdrop. In anutshell, we find that Europe has done better than could have been expected onthe basis of existing arrangements. The two federal institutions acted swiftly,the European Central Bank by providing ample liquidity and the EuropeanCommission by enforcing competition discipline flexibly. However, there was noinstitutional innovation in the form of an EU-financed bail-out of transnationalfinancial institutions or a genuine EU financial stress test. Supervisory responsibilitiesremained entirely with individual countries and coordination problemswere managed through a combination of ad-hoc, discretionary cooperation andreliance on EU rules and procedures. It is not possible, however, to determinewhether this relatively satisfactory situation is due to the fact that ad-hoccoordination was fundamentally sufficient or because no complex case of crossborderbank failure occurred. © CEPR, CES, MSH, 2010. |
