par Hunter, Paul William 
;Raskin, Jean-François
Référence Leibniz international proceedings in informatics, 29, page (365-377)
Publication Publié, 2014-12
;Raskin, Jean-François Référence Leibniz international proceedings in informatics, 29, page (365-377)
Publication Publié, 2014-12
Article révisé par les pairs
| Résumé : | Traditionally quantitative games such as mean-payoff games and discount sum games have two players - one trying to maximize the payoff, the other trying to minimize it. The associated decision problem, "Can Eve (the maximizer) achieve, for example, a positive payoff?" can be thought of as one player trying to attain a payoff in the interval (0,∞). In this paper we consider the more general problem of determining if a player can attain a payoff in a finite union of arbitrary intervals for various payoff functions (liminf/limsup, mean-payoff, discount sum, total sum). In particular this includes the interesting exact-value problem, "Can Eve achieve a payoff of exactly (e. g.) 0?". |
