par Carrillo, Juan 
;Castanheira De Moura, Micael
Référence Economic journal, 118, 530, page (845-874)
Publication Publié, 2008-07
;Castanheira De Moura, Micael Référence Economic journal, 118, 530, page (845-874)
Publication Publié, 2008-07
Article révisé par les pairs
| Résumé : | We develop a model of electoral competition in which two opportunistic candidates select their policy position and invest in quality. Policy positions are observed and, during the campaign, the press reveals some information about quality. We demonstrate that when information is imperfect, the Black-Downs median voter theorem fails to hold. For intermediate information levels, the unique equilibrium is such that candidates propose policies different from the median voter's bliss point. By contrast, convergence to the median occurs when quality is (almost) always or (almost) never revealed. We also show that a profit-maximising press may collect more information than socially optimal. © The Author(s). Journal compilation © Royal Economic Society 2008. |
