par Newey, Glen Francis 
Référence Critical review of international social and political philosophy, 15, 2, page (165-182)
Publication Publié, 2012
Référence Critical review of international social and political philosophy, 15, 2, page (165-182)
Publication Publié, 2012
Article révisé par les pairs
| Résumé : | This paper asks whether political justice can be encapsulated by procedures. It examines John Rawls's tripartite distinction between perfect, pure and imperfect procedural justice, concluding that none gives a satisfactory account of procedural justice. Imperfect procedural justice assumes that there could be an authoritative source of justice other than procedures, while perfect procedural justice takes a double-minded view of procedure-independent standards of justice. That leaves pure procedural justice as an apparently decisionistic mode of deciding which outcomes are just. This at least avoids the confusion between having authoritative procedures and procedure-independent standards that are also purportedly authoritative. However, it is argued that even a political procedure that defines the extension of a term such a 'justice' will lack authority over it once its reference is fixed. Since Rawls's categories of procedural justice are jointly exhaustive, the problem of determining justice via political procedures appears insoluble. © 2012 Taylor & Francis. |
