par Veysset, Philippe 
Référence Evolution psychiatrique, 78, 4, page (583-597)
Publication Publié, 2013-10
Référence Evolution psychiatrique, 78, 4, page (583-597)
Publication Publié, 2013-10
Article révisé par les pairs
| Résumé : | Here we must follow the fate of a silence, where, right from Sein und Zeit, Heidegger swings over the body space. It reappears, only forty years later, in the Zollikoner Seminare. But this body hasn't won its autonomy, probably because it would mean the return of definitive dismissed soul and human nature. First defined as a process, Leiben rather than Leib, body is an appearing, or better a showing. To show is to enter in relation, in order to say the absent. But to say how? Even if Heidegger and Binswanger agree on the principle of an intercorporeity, they disagree reciprocally about the nature of the relation with the other body, a body which nevertheless gives itself to see more than mine. While by Heidegger, the latter is a matter of a founding speech-even by the aphasic-by Binswanger, it is a matter of the intentionality. There intentionality is singular: it is intrinsecal to the body, it leads from the Körper to the Leib. But this leading is accomplished by means of an extrinsecal reflexivity, result of the encounter with the other man, such as she takes effect for instance in the "to take hold of": the relation with the other (external) man is made possible by the relation with the (internal) other man. The body is first intercorporeity, the silent argument of this We-ness, whose nostalgia every madness expresses, whose definitive presence, as well as a new space, all encounter establishes. © 2013. |
