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From “jouissance” to “wanting”: on the relevance of a lacanian concept to understand the wiring of the brain in addiction

par Bazan, Ariane ;Detandt, Sandrine ;Tiete, Julien
Référence 13th International Neuropsychoanalysis Congress: From addiction to relationships: neuropsychoanalytic perspectives on craving, caring and clinging (15.05.2012: Athens, Greece)
Publication Non publié, 2012-06-14

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IntroductionThe concept of «jouissance» strikes as an eminently inaccessible lacanian concept impervious to cognitive neurosciences. The «jouissance» or drive pleasure1, can be understood as a form of “benefit” from the psychopathology, which would explain the relative inability of rationalization in psychotherapy. While pleasure comes from the consumption of the one object able to relieve the body need from which the drive originates, the (course of) action leading to this satisfaction is tagged with a «jouissance» incentive2,3,4. Interestingly, departing from a completely different point of view, the neuroscientist Berridge5,6,7,8 also distinguishes “liking”, a hedonic pleasure experience, from another kind of incentive, directly related to motivation, which he calls “wanting”. “Liking” and “wanting” are based on different brain mechanism, each can occur without the other and neither need to be conscious. Strikingly, while in Berridge’s model drug addiction can be explained by an abnormal regulation of the “wanting” component alone, in psychoanalysis addiction is seen as the one psychopathology related to «jouissance»9.MethodologyWe propose a conceptual articulation of the concepts of pleasure and «jouissance» according into different operationalisable aspects: (1) affect versus drive; (2) decrease versus rise in body tension; (3) socially addressed versus secret; (4) obeying laws of rationality versus transgressive; (5) momentary versus anticipatory and repetitive.ResultsTaking all this together we propose that there are clear parallels between the two couples of concepts, pleasure and «jouissance», and liking and wanting respectively.ConclusionSpeculatively, we conclude by arguing that psychopathology in general, addiction in particular, has to be conceived much more as a problem of the (motor) dynamics of action than of affect dysregulation.References[1] Shevrin, H. (2003). The psychoanalytic theory of drive in the light of recent neuroscience findings andtheories. Paper present at the 1st annual C. Philip Wilson, MD Memorial Lecture, New York, 15.09.2003.[2] Lacan, J. (1956-1957/1994). Le séminaire, Livre IV, La relation d'objet, 1956-1957, (texte établi par Miller,J.A.), Paris: Seuil.[3] Lacan, J. (1963/1966). Kant avec Sade, in Jacques Lacan, Écrits, Paris: Seuil, 291-313.[4] Lacan, J. (1964/1973). Le séminaire, livre XI, Les quatre concepts fondamentaux de la psychanalyse, Paris:Seuil.[5] Berridge, K. C., Robinson, T. E. (1995). The mind of an addicted brain: neural sensitization of wantingversus liking. Curr Dir Psychol. Sci, 4, 71-76.[6] Robinson, T. E., & Berridge, K. C. (2001). Mechanisms of action of addictive stimuli: incentive-sensitizationand addiction. Addiction, 96, 103-114.[7] Robinson, T.E. & Berridge, K.C. (2003). Addiction. Annu Rev Psychol, 54, 25-53.[8]Robinson, T. E., Berridge, K. C. (1993). The neural basis of drug craving: an incentive-sensitization theory ofaddiction. Br Res Rev, 18, 247-291.[9] Le Poulichet, S. (1987). Toxicomanies et psychanalyse. Les narcoses du désir, Collection voix nouvelles enpsychanalyse, Paris : PUF.