par Carrillo, Juan 
;Mariotti, Thomas
Référence European economic review, 45, 1, page (1-25)
Publication Publié, 2001
;Mariotti, ThomasRéférence European economic review, 45, 1, page (1-25)
Publication Publié, 2001
Article révisé par les pairs
| Résumé : | In this paper, we analyze the selection by opportunistic parties of the candidates who run for election. We consider a setting with incomplete but symmetric information about the candidates' abilities, in which electoral campaigns provide voters with additional information about candidates. Parties care only about selecting an appropriate candidate to win the election, while voters elect the best candidate conditional on their information. We first argue that in order to defeat an established very good candidate of its rival, a party may favor a new candidate with highly uncertain ability, rather than an established good candidate. Next, we established that the discrepancy between the objective of parties and the objective of the electorate leads to inefficient conservatism in the selection of candidates, i.e. each party keeps its incumbents too often from the voters' viewpoint. © 2001 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved. |
