par Persson, Torsten;Roland, Gérard 
;Tabellini, Guido
Référence European economic review, 42, 3-5, page (685-694)
Publication Publié, 1998
;Tabellini, GuidoRéférence European economic review, 42, 3-5, page (685-694)
Publication Publié, 1998
Article révisé par les pairs
| Résumé : | Observed fiscal policy reflects the incentives embedded in political institutions. In this paper, we illustrate the effects of two general institutional features: separation of powers, which is common in presidential-congressional political systems, and legislative cohesion, which is typical of parliamentary systems. Compared to a simple legislative game, separation of powers brings about a smaller size of government and lower waste. Legislative cohesion induces a more equal distribution, but more waste and higher taxes, than separation of powers. © 1998 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved. |
